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1. Introduction  
 
This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK using 
panel data based on balance-sheets of non-financial publicly listed companies for the period of 
1985-2013.  
In the 1950s Joan Robinson (1952:86) stated that "where enterprise leads finance 
follows", describing a financial system that was merely supporting trajectories already planned 
by the productive sector. In contrast, recent structural changes in the functioning of capitalism 
mark the growing prominence of the ‘financial motives’ over the traditional productive 
purposes. The growing importance of finance led to a structural alteration in the sectoral 
composition of economic systems. In this sense, the picture for the UK economy is emblematic. 
In the 1970s, the share of manufacturing in value added was equal to 31% whilst the financial 
activities (Financial Intermediation and Real Estate -FIRE) counted for only 13%, as shown in 
Figure 1. Since 1991 the share of FIRE has surpassed manufacturing, and as of  2013 the 
financial sector represents 31.2% of the total value added, whilst that of manufacturing dropped 
to 9.8%.  Instead of being merely a vehicle for more efficient production plans, in the last 
decades the financial activities have grown disproportionately compared to the financing 
requirements of the rest of the economy. This new configuration raises the question of how this 
imbalance affected the accumulation processes in the non-financial sector.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The mainstream literature asserts that financial markets facilitate the financing and the efficient 
allocation of investment (King and Levine, 1993) argue that there is a positive correlation 
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between financial markets’ development and accumulation, growth, and efficiency. The 
development of financial markets is expected to have a positive impact on growth by fostering 
increases in total productivity (Beck et al., 2000), directly facilitating the efficient allocation of 
investment resources (Love, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004), and alleviating companies’ 
financing constraints (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), which is in turn expected to allow 
them to reach higher levels of efficiency and growth (Merton, 1995; Levine, 2005). However, 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) warn against the robustness of these results based on cross-
country evidence, which do not take into account the institutional peculiarities. Moreover, the 
effect of stock market development on growth is found to be weaker than that of the banking 
sector (Arestis et al., 2001). Recently after the 2007-2008 crash, the disproportionate growth 
of the financial system has been questioned in some mainstream contributions as well 
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2014). In particular, Law and Singh (2014) argue 
that there is a ‘threshold effect’ in the relationship between the extension of financial resources 
and growth; thus the expansion of the financial system is  beneficial to growth only up to a 
point. Recently, a similar argument has been put forward by an IMF Working Paper with 
respect to emerging markets (Sahay et al. (2015), which argues that ‘too much finance’ 
increases both economic and financial volatility. 
The Post-Keynesian literature on ‘financialization’ illustrates the negative impacts of 
expanding financial sector on the economic systems (Epstein, 2005), on income distribution 
and demand (Onaran et al., 2010; Hein, 2013), and in particular on investment (Stockhammer, 
2004, 2006; Orhagnazi, 2008a; Dallery, 2009). ‘Financialization’ is a self-reinforcing socio-
economic process, which manifests itself in the growing prominence of behaviours derived 
from the functioning of the financial sector. A similar argument can be found in the marxist 
literature, for which the long-term trajectories of the economies gravitate more around the 
financial sector and less around the productive one (Foster, 2010). Since the 1980s, the slow 
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down in investment and growth has been lower with respect to previous periods (Crotty, 2005; 
Palley, 2008; Hein, 2012; Hein and Mundt, 2012). This went along with a rise in the interest 
and dividend payments and share buybacks of the non-financial corporations (NFCs), which 
‘punctured’ the value generated by NFCs (Duménil and Levy, 2004). As a consequence, 
companies experienced a significant reduction in available funds for physical investments.1 
Stockhammer (2004) analyzes the twofold nature of financialization, and estimates the effects 
of companies’ financial payments as well as financial incomes on investment using macro data.   
Despite an expanding theoretical literature on the effects of financialization on various 
components of the economic systems, the empirical evidence is predominantly relegated to a 
macro perspective, especially in the case of physical investment. The origins of the theoretical 
microeconomic approach to the impact of finance on investment can be traced back to the 
seminal works of Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999). To the best of our 
knowledge only Orhangazi (2008b) and Demir (2009) analyse directly the effects of 
financialization on accumulation from a microeconomic perspective.  
The novelty of this paper is, firstly, to provide a model of firm-level investment, which 
extends the Post-Keynesian investment model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) by integrating the 
effects of financial incomes as well as payments in a coherent fashion. Second, we use the 
Worldscope database for firm balance sheets, which allows us to build a consistent measure 
for companies’ financial activities regarding both inflows and outflows. Third, we provide the 
first micro-econometric evidence for the UK on the effects of financialization on investment 
using firm data. Finally, we compare the explanatory power of the Post-Keynesian model to 
the mainstream Tobin’s Q model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key 
theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the alternative 
models of investment to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the estimation methodology. Section 
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5 introduces the data and the stylized facts of our sample. Section 6 presents the estimation 
results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Accumulation of fixed assets, liquidity, and financialization 
 
In the earlier ‘accelerator investment models’ (e.g. Kuh and Meyer, 1955; Evans, 1967) the 
capital expenditure was almost entirely explained by expected profitability measured by sales. 
In contrast, the early neoclassical approach modelled the firm's investment decision as a static 
maximization problem of discounted flows of profits over an infinite time horizon (Jorgenson, 
1963; 1971). As an alternative, investment models, based on the maximization of the expected 
cash flows (or market value) in the presence of adjustment costs and expectations, which take 
the dynamic process explicitly into account, have been proposed (Chirinko, 1993). Within this 
group, the so-called ‘Q model’ of Brainard and Tobin (1968), which models investment using 
the Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of the firm’s stock market valuation to its capital 
replacement cost (the capital stock adjusted for inflation and depreciation), has been widely 
used.2 However, firm-level empirical analysis has failed to provide evidence of a strong 
explanatory power of the Q variable (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Bond et al., 1992). Possible 
mainstream explanations focused on the bias of the stock market evaluation due to asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic ‘financial bubbles’ (Bond and Cummins, 
2001; Bond et al., 2004). But more importantly, as argued by Hubbard (1998), the source of 
financing matter for investment.  
Empirical evidence shows that cash-flows, i.e. internal funds, are important determinants of 
investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Blundell et al., 1992; Brown et al., 2009). In particular, the 
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seminal contribution by Fazzari et al. (1988) models firms' accumulation of fixed assets as a 
function of sales, the cost of capital, and cash-flow, showing that fluctuations in internal 
finance, as reflected by cash-flows, are statistically more important than the stock market 
evaluation in determining the level of accumulation. Liquidity constraints play a crucial role in 
determining investment (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; 
Kadapakkam et al.,1998) In conclusion, this alternative body of research suggests that the 
decision to start a new investment plan is undoubtedly connected to the choice of financing it.   
In the specific case of the UK, evidence shows that cash flow always has a signficant 
positive effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock market evaluation and debt are 
mixed (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990). Furthermore, investment is found to be more 
sensitive to cash-flow during periods in which companies distribute very few dividends in 
relation to their normal levels (Bond and Meghir, 1994). From a comparative perspective, 
internal funds are found to be a stronger and statistically more robust determinant in the UK 
than in other European countries (Bond et al., 2003; Bloom et al., 2007).  
Echoing the prevailing macroeconomic arguments, the mainstream micro-econometric 
literature on investment argues that the development of financial markets is inversely related 
to the strength of the cash flow constraint, i.e. countries with less developed financial markets 
experience lower rates of growth because of an inefficient allocation of capital  (Love, 2003; 
Love and Zicchino, 2006). Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) argues that the involvement of 
financial institutions through active monitoring can ease cash-flow constraints, and reduce 
asymmetric information in the case of the UK. Guariglia and Carpenter (2008) argue that cash 
flow is less important in explaining investment for larger companies since they experience 
minor asymmetrical credit frictions. However, the evidence in this stream of literature also 
shows that the volatility of stock market returns decreases the impact of demand on short-run 
investment, especially for larger companies (Bloom et al., 2007).   
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In conclusion, similar to the evidence for the US, also the UK firms’ investments are 
cash-flow sensitive; however the mainstream investment literature argues that companies’ 
financing issues mainly derive from agency problems, and the development of financial 
markets can relax these constraints. Within this body of literature, financial markets enter the 
analysis just as providers of information about future expected profitability ((Love, 2003; Love 
and Zicchino, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008; Devereux 
and Schiantarelli, 1990; Bond et al., 2003), as a ‘control variable’ (Love and Zicchino, 2006), 
or as a macroeconomic source of uncertainty (Bloom et al., 2007). Companies’ financial flows 
are not directly taken into account in these analyses. As a result of the transformation of the 
economies towards a financialized stage in the last decades, the mainstream models of 
investment may be misspecified due to their neglect of some important factors in the firms’ 
financing and investment decision.  
The Post-Keynesian literature offers a more holistic approach to the analysis of the 
effect of financial markets on investment, where financialized economies are characterized by 
the “increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, and financial institutions, 
and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions” (Epstein, 
2005:1). A similar argument can be found in the marxists tradition, for which the long-term 
trajectories of the economies gravitate more around the financial sector and less around the 
productive one (Foster, 2010). From a simplistic perspective, the NFCs are far from passive 
players under the control of oversized financial markets. However, financialization is a 
multifaceted concept, not reducible just to ‘quantitative’ dimensions (Sawyer, 2014). In 
addition to (or even partially substituting) physical investments, NFCs can readily accumulate 
financial assets. The Post-Keynesian literature conceives the firm as a ‘battlefield’ for different 
vested interests (Stockhammer, 2006). The most visible type of internal conflict is reflected in 
shareholders’ preference for short-term profitability, which undermines the accumulation of 
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fixed capital (Dallery, 2009; Hein and van Treeck, 2008). According to the Post-Keynesian 
theory of the enterprise, there is a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ within the managerial decision-
making process of firms (e.g. Wood, 1975; Lavoie, 1992). The increasing involvement of the 
NFCs in finance-related activities has to be understood primarily as a consequence of a change 
in the corporate governance (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2009). From the early 
1980s onwards, there has been a legitimization of the rule of maximizing the ‘shareholder 
value’ (Rappaport, 1999). While the former imperative has been to ‘retain and re-invest’ 
earnings in physical long-term investments, under the shareholder rule, to ‘downsize plants and 
distribute earnings’ is paramount. The shareholders ultimately bear the risk on investments, 
which is used to justify a claim on future corporate profits (Lazonick, 2013). The management, 
instead, has to please the shareholder’s requests by distributing dividends and boosting share 
prices through, among other ways, share buyback operations (De Ridder, 2009). Furthermore, 
financialization offers a fall back option to firms to invest in reversible short-term financial 
assets instead of irreversible long-term fixed assets, and thereby financial assets crowds out 
accumulation. This ‘behavioural twist’ negatively affected the long-term orientation of the 
investment plans. 
The vast majority of the empirical literature on the impacts of financialization on 
investment is based on a macroeconomic framework. Stockhammer (2004), van Treek (2008) 
Orhangazi (2008a) and Arestis, González, and Dejuán (2012) estimate the effects of 
financialization on investment, building on the theoretical models of Rowthorn (1981), Dutt 
(1989), and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), who formalized the seminal work of Kalecki (1954). 
Stockhammer (2004) estimates the impact of NFCs’ financial incomes (interest and dividends 
received as a ratio to the value added) and financial payments on investment for the cases of 
Germany, France, UK, and the USA, and finds that financialization, interpreted as a growing 
‘shareholder value orientation’ (henceforth SVO), induces a slowdown in accumulation. 
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However, for the UK this adverse effect is small, mainly because of an already stagnant 
accumulation dynamic (Stockhammer, 2004). Van Treeck (2008) decomposes firm’s total 
profits to retained earnings, interest payments, and dividend payments and finds significant 
negative effects of the ‘rentiers’ share’ - the extraction of firms’ internal funds via interest and 
dividends- on capital accumulation in the USA, and some mixed effects in France, Germany, 
and the UK. Orhangazi (2008a) finds that the adverse impact of financial incomes and 
payments exceeds the potential benefits in the USA. Arestis et al. (2012) model investment 
spending as an alternative to the purchase of the bonds and equities for 14 OECD and find a 
robust inverse relationship between the return on these financial assets and physical investment.    
Regarding firm level Post-Keynesian analysis of the effect of finance on investment, 
Fazzari and Mott (1986) provide evidence of an independent and positive effect of retained 
earnings, and a negative effect of the interest payments on investment. This seminal paper by 
Fazzari and Mott (1986) was particularly a response to the mainstream critiques of the use of 
liquidity measures to model investment by Jorgenson (1971), among others, who argued that 
the explanatory power of liquidity measures was ultimately due to their high correlation with 
output measures. Fazzari and Mott (1986) develop a model with both liquidity and sales 
measures to compare their independent effects, in which they aim to models the three key 
components of the Post-Keynesian theory of investment: a positive effect of sales (as a proxy 
for capacity utilization), a positive and independent effect of internal finance, i.e.‘less 
expensive’ retained earnings, and a negative impact of interest expenses.3 In particular, they 
introduce a flow measure for interest payments to define a ‘committed constraint’ on the 
available cash flow.  
In another Post-Keynesian microeconomic investment model, Ndikumana (1999) introduces 
both flow and stock variables to measure the effects of firms’ debt. The author argues that the 
stock of debt reflects the firm’s financing strategies, while the flow of interest payments is 
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ultimately independent of internal strategic decisions (reflecting external determinants). The 
ratio of cash-flow to capital, the rate of growth of sales, and Tobin’s Q are the other explanatory 
variables. Ndikumana finds a significant and negative effects of both stock and flows measures 
of debt. Firm’s indebtedness, he argues, not only reduces the cash flow (via interest payments), 
but also affects the sustainability  of investments.  
However, the works of Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999) do not model 
the impact of financial revenues, which is an important dimension of financialization. To the 
best of our knowledge, there are only two empirical microeconomic papers that analyse the 
effects of financialization on investment from a microeconomic perspective including the 
financial incomes of NFCs. Orhangazi (2008b) analyses the investment behaviour of NFCs in 
the USA explicitly taking into account the biunivocal aspect of financialization. In addition to 
the traditional determinants of investment, the author uses financial incomes and financial 
payments, as well as the debt level, as explanatory variables. He finds a significant and negative 
effect of financial payments, and long-term debt on capital accumulation. With respect to the 
financial payments, the author theorizes a ‘crowding-out’ effect: higher profits from the 
financial activities should drive a change in the priorities of the management. However, 
whereas the effects of financial incomes on investment depend on the firm size and sector, with 
a significant negative crowding out effect for larger firms, and a positive effect for the smaller 
firms in the non-durables sector, indicating its dual role as a source of internal finance. In 
general, he concludes, productive investment does not benefit from the relationship between 
NFCs and the financial markets. Demir (2009) estimates a portfolio choice model, in which 
finds that increasing returns on financial assets relative to fixed assets reduces accumulation in 
the NFCs in Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey is a function of the gap between the rates of return 
of fixed and financial assets, and a set of country specific control variables (risk and uncertainty 
measures, level of credit from the banking sector and the level of real GDP). The former 
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variable captures the market signals for future profitability of non-operating activities and the 
opportunity cost of fixed investment. The author finds that increasing returns on financial assets 
reduces fixed investment, as companies prefer to invest in ‘reversible’ short-term financial 
assets instead of ‘irreversible’ long-term fixed assets.   
Building on this literature, in the next section we describe the specifications of 
different models of investment, by comparing a basic model vis-à-vis a full specification 
which takes explicitly into account the effects of financialization including both financial 
incomes and payments. 
 
3. Alternative models of investment  
 
Within the Post-Keynesian theory capital accumulation is an intrinsically dynamic process 
(Kalecki, 1954; Lopez and Mott, 1998. Physical investment is an irreversible phenomenon. 
Different processes of financing the investment plans overlap in different time-periods, and 
there is a path dependency that link past and future levels of accumulation, as confirmed by the 
previous empirical literature (Ford and Poret, 1991; Kopcke and Brauman, 2001; Orhangazi, 
2008b; Arestis et al., 2012). Therefore, in all the models to be estimated, we include the lagged 
investment. Also all other explanatory variables are lagged in order to depict the ‘adjustment 
processes’.  
To analyse the potential effects of financialization, we start with a basic investment 
model based on Fazzari and Mott (1986). Next, by progressively enriching this basic version, 
we present our final model of ‘financialized investment’. Equation (1) presents the basic model, 
where the rate of accumulation, I/K, is: 
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where I is the addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, π is operating income, CD are 
cash dividends, (𝜋 − 𝐶𝐷) identifies the retained earnings, 𝑆 is net sales, 𝑖𝐷 is the interest 
expenses on debt; all variables are normalized by K in order to control for firm size.4 i is the 
firm index. 𝛽𝑡 identifies a set of time-dummies to control for unobservable time-specific effects 
common to all firms, whilst the standard disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 captures firm-specific fixed 
effects and idiosyncratic shocks. All variables are introduced in first and second lags to reflect 
the time consideration in the investment plans. The retained earnings/fixed assets ratio is a 
measure of the profit rate, the sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity utilization,5 
whilst interest expenses reflect the firm-level cost of capital. We expect positive effects of the 
lagged accumulation rate, retained earnings, and sales on investment. In contrast, we expect 
the impact of interest payments (or ‘cash commitments’) to be negative.6   
In this basic model cash dividends are conceived as simply a reduction of available 
internal funds. However, in developed financialized capitalist systems the distributed dividends 
may have a further effect. In fact, cash dividends paid are not just an extraction of liquidity 
from the company’s retained operating income, but they may also reflect behavioural changes 
due to the SVO as suggested by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2009). Thus, 
equation (2) introduces this further effect of cash dividends payments as a ratio to K (CD/K):  
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In light of the macroeconomic Post-Keynesian literature, we expect an adverse effect of CD/K 
on investments. 
Furthermore, not only do NFCs use part of their funds to pay interest and dividend to 
the financial (or banking) sector but, given increasing waves of financial liberalization, NFCs 
they can also more than before pursue non-operating financial investment themselves, thus 
receiving financial incomes. Therefore, in equation (3) we include the sum of interests and 
dividends received by the NFCs (𝜋𝐹) as a ratio to K as an additional explanatory variable
7: 
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Theoretically, the sign of the effect of financial incomes on investment is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, they may have a positive impact on the accumulation of fixed assets by easing the 
liquidity constraint faced by firms. In particular, this can be the case for smaller companies, 
which are more likely to experience liquidity restrictions compared to larger corporations. On 
the other hand, financial activities can also be detrimental to physical accumulation, since 
NFCs will be attracted by short-term, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in 
long-term, irreversible physical investment.   
Finally, equation (4) below presents our general model of financialized investment: 
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Here we introduce a composite measure for outward financialization, F, which is the sum of 
interest and dividend payments (as a ratio to K), capturing a) the liquidity effect of interest 
payments, and b) the additional behavioural effect of the SVO. In brief, F reflects the financial 
outflows, while 𝜋𝐹 reflects the financial inflows.  
Furthermore, in order to test the different effect of financial payments in small vs. large 
companies, we estimate an extended version of Model (4) as:  
 
 
where the dummy variable 𝐷𝑇𝐴25 takes the value 1 if the average total assets of company 𝑖 lies 
in the lower 25 percentile of the distribution, and takes the value 0 otherwise. The dummy is 
interacted with the financial incomes. While 𝛽5 is the effect of financial incomes in large 
companies, 𝛽5 + 𝛽6  captures the effect of financial incomes in smaller companies. 
With equations (4) and (4a) we aim at introducing a full model of firm-level investment 
that is coherent with the Post-Keynesian tradition of investment analysis, and that a) takes into 
account the inherent irreversibility of physical investment, b) controls for the independent 
effect of profitability and demand, c) highlights the effects of financial relations, d) makes a 
clear distinction between operating and non-operating activities, and e) treats financial 
outflows and inflows, i.e. both outward and inward financialization, as fundamental 
determinants.8 This model builds on previous literature and aim at extending the current 
empirical analysis about the financialization of investment.   
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4. Data and stylized facts  
 
We extracted our data from the Worldscope database of publicly listed firm’s balance sheets, 
which contains standardized accounting information about not only investment, sales, profits, 
interest and dividend payments but also companies’ financial incomes. Standardized data on 
financial payments and, in particular, financial incomes are difficult to find; our database 
allows us to have a comprehensive variable for our estimations. Worldscope database has been 
acknowledged as a valuable source in the literature on firm-level investment analysis (e.g. 
Cleary 1999; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 2006).  
We use data for all active and inactive, publicly listed NFCs in the UK (thus excluding 
financial firms identified by the primary SIC codes from 6000 to 6799).9 Our data are annual 
for the period of 1985-2013.10 We found a high correlation between our variables and the 
corresponding macroeconomic data.11 Tables 3A and 4A in the Appendix provide summary 
statistics for the total economy and manufacturing sector. 
It is well-known that the presence of outliers usually characterizes firm-level data. To 
prevent biased estimations, we apply a data screening process, by excluding extreme outlier 
observations from the sample. First, we select firms that have at least three consecutive 
observations for the dependent variable, which is also required for econometric purposes 
(Roodman, 2009).12 Second, we drop all the companies with a permanent negative mean 
operating income. Finally, we exclude observations in the upper and lower 1% of each 
variable’s distribution.13  
Next we present the stylized facts of our sample. As can be seen in Figure 2, the rate 
ofaccumulation of fixed assets in the UK’s NFCs  decreased substantially during the early 
1990s, and has only partially recovered, albeit not back to its peak level, with further declines 
during the Great Recession.   
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[Figure 2] 
 
Overall, the rate of accumulation has remained stagnant around an average of 0.25 for the 
whole period. Compared to the peak in 1988 (0.32), the rate is lower (0.26) in2013. The 
stagnation in the manufacturing sector (dashed line) is stronger, as it has not recovered much 
after the 1990s recession, with the rate of accumulation being the same in 2013 as in 1985 
(0.22).  
Figure 3 shows the trends in the rate of accumulation and the operating income (as a 
ratio to K). From the start of the recovery in 1992 onwards, the rate of accumulation increases 
along with the operating income; however the rise in operating income is stronger with respect 
to investment. Furthermore, from 2004 on, investment stagnates despite an increasing profit 
rate. 
[Figure 3] 
 
Figure 4 shows the ratio of investment (addition to fixed assets) to operating income; i.e. the 
rate of reinvestment, and the stock of financial assets as a ratio to fixed assets. There has been 
a clear decline of the operating income devoted to the enlargement of their core activities from 
80-90% in the 1980s to 40-50% in the last decade.  Despite the partial recovery of investments 
since 1992, the rate of reinvestment continued to decline. In sharp contrast, the stock of 
financial assets increased substantially, reaching 90% as a ratio to fixed capital in the late 
1980s, and a level more than three times the fixed assets before the crisis in 2008.14 The 
financial crisis in 2008 has led to only a slight fall in the value of the financial assets. As shown 
in figure 5, the substantial involvement in the accumulation of financial assets resulted in 
increasing non-operating income for the NFCs, which again declined briefly after the 2007-
2008 crisis, and then totally recovered in 2013.15 
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[Figure 4]  
[Figure 5] 
 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the financial payments of the NFCs in the form of interests on debt and 
dividends paid to the shareholders, which have increased substantially since the mid-1990s. 
From 1985 to 2008 financial payments (CD + 𝑖𝐷) as a ratio to total fixed capital increased from 
16% in 1985 to 42% in 2008. The financial exposition of NFCs entails a significant reduction 
of internal funds.   After the Great Recession interest paid on debt diminishes, whereas 
dividends paid maintain their increasing trend after a brief period of fall.  
 
[Figure 6] 
 
In conclusion, the stylized facts show a) a stagnant rate of accumulation b) a declining rate of 
re-investment of operating income c) an increase in the overall degree of financialization in 
terms of financial assets, incomes as well as payments.   
 
5. Estimation methodology  
 
Equations 1-4 presented in Section 3 are estimated using a dynamic panel-data model including 
two lags of the accumulation rate as explanatory variables. As explained in section 3, 
investment is an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon.  
In dynamic panel data models, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with 
the lagged dependent variables. As a consequence, standard estimators (e.g. Ordinary or 
Generalized Least Squares) would be inconsistent. Therefore, we estimate our models using a 
difference-GMM estimator (Hansen, 1982; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
This methodology is suitable for analyses based on a ‘small time/large observations’ sample.16 
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GMM is a powerful estimator for analyses based on firm-level data mainly for three reasons 
(Roodman, 2009). First, GMM is one of the best techniques to control for all sources of 
endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory variables, by using internal instruments, 
namely the lagged levels of the explanatory variables, which allows us to address dual causality, 
if rising financial payments and incomes is also a consequence of the slowdown in the capital 
accumulation.17 The instrument set consists of instruments that are not correlated with the first 
difference of the error term, but correlated with the variable we are estimating.18 Second, by 
first-differencing variables, this estimator eliminates companies’ unobservable fixed effects. 
Third, GMM can address autocorrelation problems. We apply two tests to assess the 
appropriateness of the instrument sets, and lag structures. First, we check for second-order 
serial correlation with the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, we verify 
the validity of the instruments sets through the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) which takes the 
orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of consistency 
between estimated and sample moments.19 In all models, the lagged dependent variable enters 
the instrument set as endogenous while all other explanatory variables enter as predetermined 
regressors. Consistently, the instrument sets include the second and third lags of the lagged 
dependent variable, and the first and second lags of the other lagged explanatory variables.  We 
test the joint significance of the time dummies using a Wald test. 
All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships between 
the dependent and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the logarithmic scale enables us to 
reduce the disturbances coming from the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
Our estimation procedure for each model is based on a ‘general-to-specific’ strategy, 
where we arrive at a model with only significant variables (Campos et al., 2005). Robust 
standard errors are calculated through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005).  
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6. Estimation results   
 
This section presents our estimation results. Column 1 of Table 1 shows the estimated 
coefficients for Model (1). As expected, the lagged level of accumulation, sales, and retained 
earnings have positive effects on investment, while interest expenses have a significant 
negative effect. Our results for the UK are in line with the findings of Fazzari and Mott (1986) 
for the USA.  
Column 2 shows the results for Model (2). We find a significant negative impact of CD 
reflecting the SVO. Thus, the distribution of dividends not only decreases available liquidity 
but also has a further negative behavioural effect on accumulation.  
Column 3 shows the results for Model (3). Income from the NFCs’ financial operations 
has an adverse effect on accumulation, along with a negative effect of interest expenses. Cash 
dividend payments do have a negative but statistically insignificant effect.  
Finally, Column 4 shows the results for the general model extended with a variable 
reflecting aggregated shareholder/lenders value orientation as in Model 4. In addition to the 
‘financial puncturing’ due to the external funding (banking sector and shareholders), total 
financial incomes in the form of interests and dividends received have a significant and 
negative impact on physical accumulation as well.20 Thus, financial investment crowds–out 
physical investment. All other variables have the expected signs.  
In column 5 we present an extended version of model 4 including the stock market 
evaluation (Tobin’s Q) to test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of this widely used 
variable in the mainstream literature.21 Tobin’s Q has a statistical significant and positive effect, 
and the estimated signs and even magnitudes of the other coefficients remain robust.  
 
[Table 1] 
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Finally, Column 6 of Table 1 presents the results for Model (4 a), a revised version of Model 
(4) in order to capture the different effect of financial incomes with respect to the companies’ 
sizes.  
 
 
As expected, financial incomes have a significant positive effect on physical accumulation in 
the smaller companies, with an elasticity of 0.11. This finding is in line with the microeconomic 
evidence for the USA (Orhangazi, 2008b). The effect of financial incomes in the large 
companies is still negative.  
Next, we test the robustness of our results. First, we estimate model 4 for the pre-crisis 
period of 1985-2007 only. The Great Recession affected both the real and financial sides of the 
economies. As we have seen in section 5, financial incomes experienced a sudden fall in 2008. 
Column 1 in Table 2 presents the results. The signs of the coefficients of both financial incomes 
and payments are negative also for this period. Furthermore, the coefficient of financial 
incomes is more than double compared to that in the full period.  
Second, we control also for another break in the UK economy, namely the early 1990s 
recession,22 and estimate our model for the period 1992-2007. The results reported in Column 
2 in Table 2 are similar to the ones based on the estimation for the 1985-2007 period. The only 
main difference is a stronger negative effect of the financial payments.  
 
[Table 2] 
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Third, we estimated our final model using the raw-dataset to check the robustness to the 
inclusion of the outliers for the period of 1985-2013. As can be seen in Column 3 of Table 2, 
the results are robust. 23 24  
Fourth, we performed a robustness check by excluding the public services, 
transportation, and utilities sectors (primary SIC codes from 4011 to 4971 and 9111) with a 
high degree of governmental involvement, since these companies may behave differently. As 
can be seen in Column 4 of Table 2, our estimation results are again robust.25  
Next we estimated Model (4) for the manufacturing sector only (primary SIC codes 
from 2011 to 3999). Table 3 presents the results for different periods. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
We focus on manufacturing companies for two reasons. First, our results are better comparable 
with other findings since a considerable part of the empirical analyses about firm-level 
investment is based on manufacturing. Second, as we have seen, the share of the manufacturing 
sector in the UK economy has decreased sharply (Figure 1). It is worthwhile to test if 
financialization has led to a finance-led deindustrialization. The results in Column 1 in Table 
3 are similar to the ones for the whole NFCs sample. Outward financialization, as well as 
financial incomes, had adverse effects on accumulation also in the manufacturing sector. As 
before, the magnitudes of these adverse impacts increase for both the pre-2008, and the intra-
crises periods (Columns 2 and 3). 
Finally, we present the economic significance of our estimates in Table 4.26 We compute 
the long-run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one minus the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run coefficient by the actual cumulative 
change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic effect.  
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Sales (capacity utilization) have been the main determinant of accumulation while retained 
profits had a lower impact. Financial payments, i.e. outward financialization (the composite 
variable for interest payments and SVO) had a substantial negative impact on physical 
investment. The rate of accumulation would have been 8.5% higher without the rise in financial 
payments. Financial incomes, inward financialization, had an adverse effect as well, leading to 
a decline in the accumulation rate by 3.6%. The negative impact of outward financialization 
during the pre-crisis phase (1985-2007) is substantially larger (-11.4%), due to a higher long-
run coefficient.  
[Table 4] 
 
Unsurprisingly, the 2008 crisis has strongly reduced the financial incomes of NFCs. The 
cumulative increase in financial incomes before the financial crisis is much higher (1.233) than 
the increase in the full period (0.751).27 Additionally, the long-run elasticity of financial income 
is stronger in this period (-0.109). Hence, in the pre-crisis phase financial incomes have had a 
larger negative impact on accumulation. The accumulation rate would have been 13.5% higher 
without an increase in financial incomes.  
Also in the manufacturing sector, the sharp rise in financial payments reduced the rate 
of accumulation by 13.5% from 1985 to 2013, and by almost 20% before the crisis.  The 2008 
financial crisis led to a decrease in the financial incomes of manufacturing, which in turn had a 
positive economic impact on the rate of accumulation in manufacturing companies by 10.2%. 
Given the higher elasticities, financial payments had the strongest negative economic effects in 
both time periods.  
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7. Conclusion   
 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of financialization on firm-level 
investment in the publicly listed NFCs in the UK based on a dynamic panel data model. Our 
results show that financialization, depicted as the increasing orientation towards external 
financing, and the internal substitution of fixed accumulation by financial activity, had a 
fundamental role in suppressing investment in the NFCs in the UK. This is even more evident 
in the period before the financial crash, and especially for the manufacturing sector. The 
availabilty of internal funds constrain the investment decision. On the one hand, the increase 
in financial payments for external finance and to favor the shareholders (interest and dividends) 
reduce the NFCs internal funds, and thus accumulation. On the other hand, the negative 
crowding-out effects of financial investment on accumulation more than offset the gains from 
relaxing the cash-flow constraint.  Financial incomes have a positive effect on investment only 
for the smaller companies.  
In the UK NFCs, the rate of accumulation would have been 8.5% higher without the 
rise in interest and dividend payments in 2007 compared to 1985, and 3.6% higher without the 
crowding-out effect of increasing financial incomes.28 The negative effects of financialization 
have been stronger in the pre-crisis period. The physical accumulation in manufacturing sector 
suffered even more experiencing a finance-led deindustrialisation. In particular, for the pre-
crisis period in manufacturing we find that the adverse effects of financial payments and 
financial incomes almost entirely offset the positive impacts due to increasing sales and 
retained profits.  
These results for the UK provide support to the theoretical arguments regarding the 
negative effects of financialization and confirm previous empirical findings at the macro and 
microeconomic levels for other countries. The increasing interrelations between the financial 
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markets and the non-financial companies are progressively reducing fixed capital 
accumulation, and thus growth. These results contrast with the mainstream arguments 
regarding the beneficial effects of financial deepening (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 
2000; Levine, 2005).  
To reach a stable and vigorous dynamic of physical investment, a de-financialization 
of the non-financial sector is desirable. This requires an extended regulation of companies’ 
non-operating financial activities along with financial regulation. The robust evidence of 
investment irreversibility and the connection between past and present levels of physical 
accumulation increases the potential effectiveness of de-financialization economic policies. 
Clearly our analysis does not exhaust the need for a deeper analysis about 
financialization of the NFCs, and further research is needed to assess the multifaceted feature 
of this phenomenon. In particular, the investigation of the determinants of companies’ 
‘financial accumulation’, as well as the sources of businesses’ financial assets are important 
questions for future research.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure1. Value added in the financial and manufacturing sectors as a ratio to total value added 
in the UK (%) 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Rate of accumulation (I/K) in NFCs in all sectors and in Manufacturing in the UK  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 3. Rate of accumulation (I/K) and operating income (π/K) in NFCs, the UK  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Investment/Operating income (I/π), and financial assets/fixed assets (FA/K) in NFCs, 
the UK     
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 5. Investment/Operating income (I/π), and non-operating income (𝝅𝑭/K) in NFCs, the UK 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cash dividends/fixed assets (CD/K), and interest paid on debt (𝑖𝐷 /K) in the NFCs, the 
UK  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Table 1. Estimation results based on Models (1), (2), (3), and (4);  dependent variable (𝐼/𝐾)𝑡; Estimation period 1985-2013 
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Table 2. Estimation results based on Model (4) for different time periods, sectors, and sample; 
dependent variable (𝐼/𝐾)𝑡  
 
 
Table 3. Estimation results based on Model (4) for the manufacturing sector; dependent 
variable (𝐼/𝐾)𝑡 
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Table 4. Economic effects based on estimation results in Table 1,Table 2,  and Table 3 
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Appendices  
 
Table 1A. Variables definition, and codes. 
 
 
Table 2A. Correlations between ONS macroeconomic data and Worldscope sample data.  
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Table 3A. Summary statistics, NFCs, the UK; all sectors 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
N = number of total observations, n= number of groups, T-bar = average time period  
 
Table 4A. Summary statistics, NFCs, the UK; manufacturing sector 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
N = number of total observations, n= number of groups, T-bar = average time period  
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Endnotes   
1 In contrast, some authors of the Marxian tradition (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; Kliman and Williams, 2014) 
argue for a reversed causality, i.e. financialization of the economy should be understood as a 
consequence, and not as a cause of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. 
2 Tobin’s Q is expected to reflect the present discounted value of expected future profits under a perfect 
market hypothesis (Hayashi, 1982), assuming that the source of financing is ultimately irrelevant 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
3 The paper provides a response to the mainstream critiques of the use of liquidity measures to model 
investment by Jorgenson (1971). 
4 Variables definitions are in Appendix Table1A. In our version of the model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) 
we add the lagged rate of accumulation as an additional explanatory variable. Secondly, we do not need 
a variable for the gross plant value, since we already control for the companies’ size by scaling each 
variable as a ratio to fixed capital. 
5 Output/potential output is potential output as a ratio to capital stock, which is a measure of technology. With 
constant technology in the short time period, the technological change is captured by time effects (which we 
control for). Thus, it is often used as a measure of capacity utilization, in particular due to a lack of data for *. 
Profit rate and sales are standard variables in the firm level investment literature. However, econometrically, there 
may be issues of correlation between the first two. Therefore, we estimated alternative models to show that the 
effects of retained operating income and sales are robust and positive in many different specifications. Results are 
available upon request. 
6 In our version of the model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) we add the lagged rate of accumulation as an 
additional explanatory variable, thus providing a dynamic representation of the investment process. 
Secondly, we do not need a variable for the gross plant value, since we already control for the 
companies’ size by scaling each variable as a ratio to fixed capital. 
7 Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-operating financial incomes of NFCs. In fact 
Krippner (2005) shows how capital gains account for a considerable part of NFCs financial profits. 
However, as recognised by Orhangazi (2008b) with respect to Compustat database, also in Worldscope 
data on capital gains are not available. 
8 We also extended the model with total debt/fixed capital, and change in or the square of this ratio, but we did 
not find any statistically significant effects. Results are available upon request. An extended model with share 
buybacks was not feasible due to lack of data.   
9 Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, 1994 version.  
10 The choice of the time-period is due to data availability. 
11 We compare our sample with data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in Appendix Table2A. 
Macro data for detailed variables are available only for 1997-2013. ONS does not provide a 
disaggregation for publicly listed and private companies. 
12 This is the accepted lower threshold for a GMM estimator (see Roodman, 2009) 
13 We follow Chirinko et. al. (1999) and Orhangazi (2008b) for defining the outliers. Our estimations are 
robust to the inclusion of the outliers.   
14 We employ a comprehensive definition of financial assets (see the Appendix, Table 1A). 
15 Milberg and Winkler (2009) argue that the accumulation-financialization link is blurred by the increase 
in off-shoring. This is not a problem in our case, since all our data are provided on a consolidated basis 
(parent company plus subsidiaries). Moreover, the non-operating dividend incomes come from financial 
activities.  
16 The full period is 29 years, but the average period for which all the variables are available is 6-9 years. 
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17 The use of a GMM estimator allows us to address a dual causality, if financialization of the economy 
(rising financial payments and incomes) is also a consequence of the slowdown in the capital 
accumulation as suggested by Lapavitsas, (2009). 
18 The final estimates come from the combination of instruments and a vector of parameters that shows the 
minimum correlation between the error term and the instruments. 
19  Hansen test takes the orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of 
consistency between estimated and sample moments. We tested and confirmed the presence of heteroskedasticity 
in our sample by using the White/Koenker and the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg tests. All these tests 
reject the homoscedasticity of our error terms. As argued by Roodman (2009), Hansen’s-J test is preferred to the 
Sargan test in the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. However, the Hansen test (as the Sargan test) 
is sensitive to the total number of instruments. Therefore, we use only the first and second lags of our variables as 
instruments. Furthermore, all instruments are ‘collapsed’, thus having an instrument for each variable and lag 
distance. 
20 Financial income is significant only at the second lag, indicating a longer time lag for this impact to 
become effective. 
21 We use the approximate average measure for Tobin’s Q suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994:71), who define 
it as  a compromise between “analytical precision and computational effort based on the well-established 
procedure by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). Tobin’s Q is treated as endogenous based on the Hansen-test. 
22  We refer to the data from Office for National Statistics (ONS) in order to define the time periods.  
23 Furthermore, we checked the robustness of our results by excluding firms with a logarithmic change in sales 
higher than 1 (only 5 firms excluded). The estimated coefficients are robust.   
24 However, this model presents a borderline value for the Arellano-Bond second order autocorrelation test. 
25 Furthermore, we run a robustness check on equation (4) by excluding firms (only 5) with a dloglogarithmic 
change in the levels of sales higher than 1 (only 5 firms excluded100%). The estimated coefficients are robust to 
this exclusion. Results are available upon request.  
26 The economic effects for 1992 and 2007 are very similar to the 1985-2007. Results are available upon 
request.  
27 The actual change of financial incomes is positive even if we take into account the financial crisis. This 
is due to the recovery of interest and dividends incomes since 2009.  
28 Milberg and Winkler (2009) argue that the accumulation-financialization link is blurred by the increasing 
in off-shoring activities from advanced to developing economies. Our results are robust to this critique. 
This is not a problem in our case, since all our data are provided on a consolidated basis (parent company 
plus subsidiaries). Moreover, the non-operating dividend incomes comes from financial, thus non-
physical, investment in subsidiaries activities.  
